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CONFLICT OF LAWS
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure • Statute of
Limitations • State Policy • Relation Back
Marshall v. Mulrenin, 508 F.2d 39 (1st Cir. 1974)
N SEPTEMBER OF 1967, Mrs. Marshall fell and injured herself on business
premises in Massachusetts known as Craig Village by the Sea. In July of
1969, the Marshalls retained counsel, instituting a diversity action in the
Massachusetts Federal District Court. The Marshalls named as defendants
Mr. and Mrs. Kirk, the individuals whose names appeared on the certificate
on file in the town hall in accordance with Massachusetts law' as the "real
name of the person conducting the business."
The premises had in fact been conveyed by the Kirks to Mr. and Mrs.
Mulrenin several years before the accident. The Kirks, however, in violation of
the Massachusetts statute, had not filed a notice of discontinuance as required
in order to update the certificate on file in the town hall. The Mulrenins
continued to operate the business under the original name without filing a
new certificate. The Marshalls did not discover, until after the Massachusetts
statute of limitations for personal injury actions had run, that the named
defendants, the Kirks, no longer owned the premises. The Marshalls therefore
sought to amend by dismissing against the Kirks and naming the Mulrenins
as defendants in the action.
The First Circuit Court of Appeals held that, in spite of federal rule
15 (c), 2 the Marshalls had an absolute right under Massachusetts law3 to bring
in the Mulrenins. This ruling reversed the district court which had held that
the amendment was impermissible under rule 15(c) and did not relate back.
A contra finding by the First Circuit Court of Appeals as to the
permissibility of this amendment under rule 15(c) would have avoided
a conflict between state law and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The
Marshalls contended that the notice given the Kirks, whom the Mulrenins
permitted to appear as owners of record, should have been considered
constructive notice to the Mulrenins within the meaning of rule 15(c). The
First Circuit Court of Appeals stated that:
This, however, is by no means an obvious conclusion. There was no
evidence that the Mulrenins were aware of the statute, or that it had been
violated by the prior owners' leaving their certificate on file. We do not
pursue the matter, in the absence of authority, because we believe
'MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 110, § 5 (1958).
2 FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c).
3 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 51 (1959).
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that in spite of Rule 15(c), plaintiff had an absolute right under
Massachusetts law to bring in the Mulrenins.'
Some federal courts have followed the rule that amendments to correct
misnomer or misdescription of a defendant will relate back where the proper
defendant is in court. An amendment which substitutes or adds a new party,
however, creates a new cause of action, and under such circumstances, there is
normally no relation back to original filing for purposes of limitations.' Since
the 1966 amendment of rule 15(c), however, a number of courts have permitted
amendments substituting defendants after the statute of limitations has run.'
The critical factor involved in rule 15 (c) determinations is notice.7 As
Professor Moore has stated in his treatise on federal civil procedure: "rule
15 (c) is based on the idea that a party who is notified of litigation concerning
a given transaction or occurrence is entitled to no more protection from
statutes of limitations than one who is informed of the precise legal description
of the rights sought to be enforced." 8 The party that is sought to be substituted
"must receive notice of the action 'within the period provided by law for
commencing the action against him.' "9
In Simmons v. Fenton,10 plaintiffs commenced an action for personal
injuries on the last day of a two-year limitation period. After expiration of
the statute of limitations, service was made on the named defendant, the
12-year-old daughter of the woman who was driving one of three cars involved
in a collision. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the plaintiffs
were not entitled to have an amendment of the pleadings and service of
process, substituting the mother as defendant and relating back to the original
pleading under rule 15(c). The mother had not received the requisite notice
within the limitation period and would have been prejudiced if the
amendment had been allowed.
Mulrenin, like Hanna v. Plumer," presents a case where there is a conflict
4Marshall v. Mulrenin, 508 F.2d 39, 41 (lst Cir.1974).
, E.g., Marlow v. Fisher Body, 489 F.2d 1057 (6th Cir. 1973); Longbottom v. Swabey,
397 F.2d 45 (5th Cir. 1968); United States v. Western Cas. & Surety Co., 359 F.2d 521
(6th Cir. 1966); Anderson v. Phoenix of Hartford Ins. Co., 320 F. Supp. 399 (W.D. La.
1970); Storey v. Garrett Corp., 43 F.R.D. 301 (C.D. Cal. 1967); King v. Udall, 266
F. Supp. 747 (D.D.C. 1967).
6 E.g., Meredith v. United Airlines, 41 F.R.D. 34 (S.D. Cal. 1966). But cf. Craig v.
United States, 413 F.2d 854 (9th Cir. 1969). See also Trotter v. Cone Automatic Mach.
Co., 48 F.R.D. 100 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
7 Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 438 F.2d 1286 (5th
Cir. 1971). See also Graves v. General Ins. Corp. 412 F.2d 583 (10th Cir. 1969); Baker
v. Ferguson Research, Inc., 61 F.R.D. 637 (D. Mont. 1974).
8 3 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 15.15[21, at 1021 (2d ed. 1974).
9 Simmons v. Fenton, 480 F.2d 133, 137 (7th Cir. 1973).
10 1d. 11 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
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between the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and state law. Whether federal
courts should apply the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or contrary state law
in diversity actions is a decision that continues to be plagued with uncertainty.
Hanna held that rule 4(d) (1),1_2 which controls service of process in diversity
actions, neither exceeded the congressional mandate embodied in the Rules
Enabling Act,"3 nor transgressed constitutional bounds and, therefore, took
precedence over the conflicting Massachusetts rule."
The holding of Hanna is based on the congressional mandate embodied
in the Rules Enabling Act which delegated authority to the Supreme Court to
establish the federal rules of procedure. 5 The Rules Enabling Act states
emphatically that the federal rules are only to regulate procedure and "shall
not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive rights."" The definition of
what is substantive and what is procedural was of necessity left to the courts
to determine under the Enabling Act within the bounds of its legislative intent
and the Constitution. The Enabling Act was passed in 1934, approximately
four years before Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins"7 was decided. There would seem
to be no compulsion to look to Erie to resolve this definitional problem, except
as Erie happened to address this question and define the constitutional
bounds. The Hanna Court specifically pointed out 8 that the Erie rule "9 is not
the appropriate test to use in determining the validity, and therefore the
applicability of one of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 0
The Hanna Court indicated that the "outcome-determinative" test which
was set forth in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York,' a descendant of Erie, is likewise
12 FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d) (1).
13 Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1958).
14 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 197, § 9 (1958).
15 380 U.S. at 463-64, 470-71.
16 Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1958).
17 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
18 380 U.S. at 469-70.
19 Erie held that there is no federal general common law, that Congress has no power to
declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a state, and that federal courts
must apply state substantive law. This was based on the rationale that, when federal
courts applied federal common law, there was an unconstitutional invasion of rights
reserved to the states.
20 The directive of Erie, as pointed out by the Hanna Court, is essentially the same as
the Rules Enabling Act, viz., federal courts must apply federal procedural law and state
substantive law. It would seem that only when a state rule is characterized as substantive
instead of procedural should the Erie doctrine come into play to achieve the objectives of
elimination of forum shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the law.
Erie therefore, seemingly should provide no guidance on how to determine or define
what is substantive and what is procedural under the circumstances of Hanna, or
Mulrenin, except as these objectives are deemed relevant in determining whether or not
the particular state law is substantive in construing the Enabling Act.
21 See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945) wherein the "outcome
determinative" test was announced: "And so the question is not whether a statute of
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inappropriate. The Supreme Court pointed out in Hanna that "every procedural
variation is 'outcome-determinative' "22 in the sense that the outcome of the
case depends on the particular ruling of the court at the point an encountered
conflict between a state rule and a federal rule of procedure is resolved.
Carried to extreme, the York test would virtually mandate the use of state
rules of civil procedure and thereby frustrate the legislative intent of the
Rules Enabling Act, viz., the goal of uniformity in federal practice.2"
While Hanna can be interpreted to be an assertion of the supremacy of
the federal rules,"4 the validity of such an interpretation is uncertain since the
Supreme Court distinguished rather than overruled its earlier decision in
Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co. 5 In Ragan, the complaint was
filed before the statute of limitations had run; the defendant was not served,
however, until after the statutory period. Under Kansas law, considered in
Ragan, the service must have occurred within the statutory period, while filing
alone was sufficient under the federal rule.2" The Ragan Court characterized
the state rule as substantive within the meaning of the Erie doctrine. The courts
are divided on the question of whether Ragan is still authoritative after Hanna.
The Hanna doctrine has been widely applied in the courts of appeals.25
limitations is deemed a matter of 'procedure' in some sense. The question is ... does it
significantly affect the result of a litigation for a federal court to disregard a law of a
State that would be controlling in an action upon the same claim by the same parties
in a State court?"
22 380 U.S. at 468-69.
23 Various federal rules have been attacked as affecting substantive rights; however, the
rules have been upheld. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965) (rule 4[d][ll);
Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104 (1964) (rule 35[aI); Cold Metal Process Co. v.
United Engineering & Foundry Co., 351 U.S. 445 (1956) (amended rule 54[b]);
Mississippi Publishing Co. v. Murphee, 326 U.S. 438 (1946) (rule 4[f]); Sibbach v.
Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941) (rule 35); cf. Perry v. Allen, 239 F.2d 107 (5th Cir.
1956).24 See Meredith v. United Airlines, 41 F.R.D. 39 (S.D. Cal. 1966); C. WRIGHT, LAW OF
FEDERAL COURTS, § 59, at 245 (2d ed. 1970).
25 Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949).
26 FED. R. Civ. P. 3.
27 Compare Sylvestri v. Warner & Swasey Co., 398 F.2d 598, 604-06 (2d Cir. 1968);
Grabowski v. United States, 294 F. Supp. 421 (D. Wyo. 1968); Elizabethtown Trust
Co. v. Konschak, 267 F. Supp. 46 (E.D. Pa. 1967); with Groninger v. Davison, 364
F.2d 638 (8th Cir. 1966); Sylvester v. Messler, 351 F.2d 472 (6th Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 1011 (1966); Tanner v. Presidents-First Lady Spa, Inc., 345 F. Supp.
950 (E.D. Mo. 1972); Hendricksen v. Roosevelt Hospital, 276 F. Supp. 731 (S.D.N.Y.
1967); O'Shea v. Binswanger, 42 F.R.D. 21 (D. Md. 1967).
28 E.g., Ransom v. Brennan, 437 F.2d 513 (5th Cir. 1971) (substitution of executor
governed by federal rules); Sylvestri v. Warner & Swasey Co., 398 F.2d 598 (2d Cir.
1968); Crowder v. Gordons Transports, Inc., 387 F.2d 413 (8th Cir. 1967) (federal
rules govern relation back of amended complaint); Har-Pen Truck Lines, Inc. v. Mills,
378 F.2d 705 (5th Cir. 1967); Szantay v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 349 F.2d 60 (4th Cir.
1965).
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While the cases are divided, a number of courts have determined, subsequent
to Hanna,9 that state law need not be followed in cases involving relation back
of amendments as to defendants"0 after the statute of limitations has run. 1
In Swartzwalder v. Hamilton,32 the plaintiff, injured in an auto accident,
brought an action against a party whom he thought was the driver and owner
of the vehicle. The named defendant, however, was neither the driver nor the
owner. After the statute of limitations had run, plaintiff sought to substitute
the driver and her husband as defendants. The District Court for the Middle
District of Pennsylvania held that current federal practice under rule 15, not
state law, controls the question of whether an amendment substituting a party
defendant can be made after expiration of the statute of limitations. The
Swartzwalder court permitted substitution, even though the statute had run,
since the parties sought to be substituted as defendants had notice of the action.
The defendants were in the auto at the time of the collision and could
not complain that they did not know of the suit within the period of
the statute of limitations.
In Meredith v. United Airlines," the District Court for the Southern
District of California held that, in view of Hanna, the doctrine of Erie does
not require the application of state law rather than federal law as to relation
back. The Meredith court, citing Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson,14
further pointed out that no party has any vested or substantive right in the
protection of a statute of limitations.
In Martz v. Miller Brothers Co.,3" the Federal District Court for the
District of Delaware determined that, in spite of a contrary result under
Delaware law, the question of whether an amended pleading relates back is
29 Even before the Hanna decision, courts have held that federal rule 15(c) should
control relation back in the face of the Erie doctrine. See, e.g., Aarhus Oliefabrik, A/S
v. A. 0. Smith Corp., 22 F.R.D. 33 (E.D. Wis. 1958); cf. Gifford v. Wichita Falls &
So. Ry. Co., 224 F.2d 374 (5th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 895 (1955).
:0 Welch v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 466 F.2d 1344, 1345 (5th Cir. 1972);
Loudenslager v. Teeple, 466 F.2d 249, 250 (3d Cir. 1972); Williams v. Avis Transport
of Canada, Ltd., 57 F.R.D. 53, 56 (D. Nev. 1972); Swartzwelder v. Hamilton, 56
F.R.D. 606, 608 (M.D. Pa. 1972); Meredith v. United Airlines, 41 F.R.D. 34, 39 (S.D.
Cal. 1966); Cone v. Shunka, 40 F.R.D. 12, 14 (W.D. Wisc. 1966); Martz v. Miller
Bros. Co., 244 F. Supp. 246, 250 (D. Del. 1965).
31 A number of courts, applying federal law rather than state law, have allowed amend-
ments as to plaintiffs after the statute of limitations has run. See, e.g., Longbottom v.
Swabey, 397 F.2d 45 (5th Cir. 1968); Crowder v. Gordons Transports, Inc., 387 F.2d
413 (8th Cir. 1967); Holmes v. Pennsylvania New York Cent. Transp. Co., 48 F.R.D.
449 (N.D. Ind. 1969); Newman v. Freeman, 262 F. Supp. 106 (E.D. Pa. 1966)
(Applied 15[c] rather than state law which would have disallowed the amendment).
32 Swartzwelder v. Hamilton, 56 F.R.D. 606 (M.D. Pa. 1972).
33 Meredith v. United Airlines, 41 F.R.D. 34, 39 (S.D. Cal. 1966).
3, Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304 (1945).
35 Martz v. Miller Bros. Co., 244 F. Supp. 246 (D. Del. 1965).
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procedural; and, therefore, the federal court is not required to follow state
law. The Martz court pointed out that the courts which have permitted
relation back of amendments adding defendants after the statute of limitations
had run, have utilized one or more of three theories:
(1) that neglect of the plaintiff or his attorney in suing the wrong party
was excusable, (2) that defendant had misled plaintiff or "lulled" him
into the feeling that he had sued the right defendant when he had not, or
(3) that the party actually sued and the party whom plaintiff meant to
sue had sufficient "identity of interest."36 (footnotes omitted.)
The court indicated that cases" in the second category at times proceeded
on an estoppel theory.
In spite of Hanna v. Plumer, some federal courts have applied state law
instead of rule 15(c) in diversity actions involving relation back of
amendments. 8 In Burns v. Turner Construction Co., 9 an action to recover for
injuries sustained in falling off a platform, the plaintiff filed an amended
complaint to add several new defendants after the statute of limitations had
run. The Federal District Court of Massachusetts held that under the Erie
doctrine, a federal court in a diversity action should apply the law of the forum
state regarding amendments as to parties. The court indicated, however, that
relation back would not have been allowed under rule 15(c) due to lack of
notice and probable prejudice to new defendants. In Nave v. Ryan, "° a
diversity action for wrongful death, the plaintiff sought to amend the
complaint, which alleged malpractice, to join an anesthesiologist as an
additional party defendant. The amendment was filed after the Connecticut
one-year statute of limitations had run. Citing York and Ragan, the Federal
District Court of Connecticut held that the Connecticut rule controlled
and must be applied because the court "may not keep alive a right which
has lapsed under state law."'
Courts that have applied state law instead of the federal rules have
chosen to disregard the Hanna Court's view that Enabling Act rationale, rather
than that of Erie, should be the test in these cases. 2 The Hanna court, in
fact, distinguished the line of cases that have attacked the rules as invading
36 Id. at 250-51.
37 E.g., Williams v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 91 F. Supp. 652 (D. Del. 1950).
38 Burns v. Turner Constr. Co., 265 F. Supp. 768 (D. Mass. 1967); Nave v. Ryan, 266
F. Supp. 405 (D. Conn. 1967); ci. Anderson v. Pappillion, 445 F.2d 841 (5th Cir. 1971).
39 Burns v. Turner Constr. Co., 265 F. Supp. 768 (D. Mass. 1967).
40 Nave v. Ryan, 266 F. Supp. 405 (D. Conn. 1967).
41 Id. at 407.
42 380 U.S. at 470. See Johnson Chemical Co. v. Condado Center, Inc., 453 F.2d 1044,
1046 (lst Cir. 1972).
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substantive rights and exceeding the grant of power in the Enabling Act 3
from the line of cases which are the progeny of Erie."
In spite of the Hanna Court's view that the Erie rule is not the appropriate
test to use in determining the validity and applicability of a federal rule of civil
procedure, the Mulrenin court chose to base its decision on Erie rationale. The
First Circuit Court of Appeals pointed out that: "Although Rule 15, on its
face, conflicts with section 51, to apply the rule would mean that the choice of
forum 'would wholly bar recovery.' "' The Mulrenin court considered Hanna's
holding to be contained in its disclaimer of an intent to effect substantive
results. The court said, in Erie-styled prose:
Such a construction does not, of course, render Federal Rules inoperative
in their procedural aspects. It merely means that a rule is not to be
applied to the extent, if any, that it would defeat rights arising from
state substantive law as distinguished from state procedure. This line
may not always be easy to draw."6
The First Circuit Court of Appeals dedicated a sizeable portion of its
opinion in Marshall v. Muirenin to its views on the Supreme Court's decision
in Hanna." The First Circuit concluded that, in Hanna, the Supreme Court
misconstrued the Massachusetts statute that it struck down, "but that this
misreading is not to be taken as part of the ratio decidendi so far as the
treatment of other state statutes in other circumstances is concerned.""8 One
may interpret this position to mean that the rationale of the Hanna Court is
appropriate as to state statutes where a strong underlying public policy is not
present. The Mulrenin court places much emphasis49 on the "strong public
policy" behind the state statute"9 that was in conflict with rule 4(d) (1) in
Hanna. The court also implied that a strong state policy is behind the statute5 '
involved in Mulrenin. The First Circuit indicated, apparently based in large
part on these considerations," that Hanna was therefore only "superficially
4 E.g., Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104 (1964) (rule 35[a]); Cold Metal Process
Co. v. United Engineering & Foundry Co., 351 U.S. 445 (1956) (amended rule 54[b]);
Mississippi Publishing Co. v. Murphee, 326 U.S. 438 (1946) (rule 4[f]); Sibbach v.
Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941) (rule 35).
44 E.g., Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949); Guaranty
Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
45 508 F.2d at 44.
46 Id.
4 7 See 508 F.2d at 41, n.2, where the court notes that it is conscious of the fact that it
was the court which the Supreme Court unanimously reversed in Hanna.48 d. at 41. 49 Id. at 42-43.
50 MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 197, § 9 (1958).
51 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 51 (1959).
52 See generally Johnson Chemical Co. v. Condado Center, Inc., 453 F.2d 1044, 1046
(1st Cir. 1972) (the court interprets Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Coop. Inc., 356
U.S. 525 [1958], as having added a new criterion to Erie-type problems, viz., that a
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apposite" to the decision of whether to look to state law or federal law under
the facts of Mulrenin 3 The Hanna Court, however, appeared to be fully
cognizant of this underlying public policy argument since the opinion took
note of the fact that the court of appeals seemed to frame the inquiry in terms
of how "important" section 9 was to the state of Massachusetts and that section
9 was designed to make sure that the executors receive actual notice.5"
Mr. Justice Harlan, in his concurring opinion in Hanna, concluded that
last and usual service under rule 4 affords substantially as good a notice as the
Massachusetts statute. He did not see the application of rule 4 (d) (1), instead
of the Massachusetts service rule, as having a substantial effect on the speed
with which estates are distributed. Such a practice would simply mean that an
executor would have to check at his own house or the federal courthouse, as
well as the registry of probate, before he could distribute the estate without
fear of being held personally liable for further liabilities that may be outstand-
ing. Mr. Justice Harlan then concluded that the variation between rule
4(d) (1) and the Massachusetts law was not substantial 5 and did "not seem
enough to give rise to any impingement on the vitality of the state policy
which the Massachusetts rule is intended to serve." 56
The Hanna Court did not appear to be compelled to classify a
right as substantive merely because a strong state policy or clear legislative
intent was present. Instead, the Court relied on Enabling Act rationale, refer-
ring to federal rules of civil procedure as "housekeeping" rules for the courts,
even though some of them will inevitably differ from comparable state rules. 7
Continued application of the rationale of Erie and its progeny to resolve
conflicts between the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and state law will only
preserve the confusion now inherent in this area of the law. The approach
taken by the Hanna Court to resolve these, conflicts appears to be much
preferred over an analysis of whether a particular state policy is strong enough
to classify the right as substantive. Uniform application of Enabling Act
rationale would lend a great deal more certainty to this area of the law and
would honor, rather than frustrate, the legislative intent of the Rules Enabling
Act, viz., the goal of uniformity in federal practices?8
GARY I. KRUGER
balancing of the policies behind the federal and state laws in conflict was added to the
determination of which law to apply).
53 508 F.2d at 41.
54 380 U.S. at 468, n.9.
55 Id. at 469, n. 11.
5i ld. at 478.
57 Id. at 473.
58 See C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 66, at 276 (2d ed. 1970).
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